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## HOW TO HUSSERL A QUINE - AND A HEIDEGGER, TOO

**ABSTRACT.** Is consciousness or the subject part of the natural world or the human world? Can we write intentionality, so central in Husserl's philosophy, into Quine's system of ontological naturalism and naturalized epistemology - or into Heidegger's account of human being and existential phenomenology? The present task is to show how to do so. Anomalous monism provides a key.

If you Husserl a Quine, you get a Follesdal. But how in the world of philosophy do you do that?

Fellow-travelers in the border country of phenomenology and intentional logic have long marveled at the sure and natural stride with which this walker of distant and beautiful terrain, Dagfinn Follesdal, combines the intellectual virtues of two so disparate philosophers: Edmund Husserl, phenomenologist, and Willard Van Orman Quine, logician.

Here I want to seek out a path less traveled, orienteering the status of intentionality in Quine and Husserl - and Heidegger by the way.

### 1. SUBJECT AND OBJECT

The subject/object of these reflections is the subject-object relation.

How is the knowing subject related to the object known? Is the subject part of the world of objects known? More generally, what is the nature of the intentional relation between subject and object in intentional attitudes or activities of believing, perceiving, desiring, etc.?

Opposing views are spied in the writings of Husserl, Heidegger, and Quine. For Quine, human knowledge is a natural phenomenon, to be studied by natural science. For Husserl, intentionality - representation in consciousness - is an extra-natural phenomenon, to be studied in the transcendental science of phenomenology. For Heidegger, intentionality - our comportment toward entities in the world - is part of the familiar human world in which we live; our intentional activity is part

wholes, and his account of the essences of consciousness and nature. His part-whole theory was developed in the Fourth of his *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 1970a), while his account of these essences was developed in *Ideas*. Let us grant his formal ontology of parts and wholes, for the sake of present discussion. What of his ontology of essences?

In a context including Quine, we should note that essences are not essential, as opposed to accidental, attributes. In *Ideas* I (§§1ff.) essence (*Wesen*) is distinguished from fact (*Tatsache*). Fact concerns existence, which objects are actual. The essence of an object is *what* it is, and involves its species, properties, and relations. Properties are essential to an object only qua a certain kind.

Husserl assumes a categorial ontology in which kinds form genus-species hierarchies. The highest material genera are called regions (§9). And the essences Nature and Consciousness, Husserl assumes, are distinct regions (§§47ff.). Objects in the region of Nature are characterized by being in spacetime, being material in composition, and being in causal relations. Acts of consciousness, in the region of Consciousness, are characterized by intentionality: the essence of consciousness is intentionality.

The problem posed by Husserl is thus how intentionality can be a part of nature. Let us call this problem the *paradox of intentionality*.<sup>3</sup> Paradox lies in the fact that intentionality seems to be part of the natural world yet is not reducible to physical properties such as causal relations to objects. The irreducibility was stressed by Husserl's teacher Franz Brentano, and Quine has concurred with Brentano, in *Word and Object* (1960) and in *Pursuit of Truth* (1990). The point needs no pressing in present company.

How do we resolve the paradox of intentionality?

In one direction lies physicalism, of a sort that rejects intentionality. Such was Quine's choice in *Word and Object*. (*Pursuit of Truth* takes a different attitude, as we note below.)

Cartesian dualism might dissolve the paradox by keeping intentionality with the mental, denying any intentional relation between minds and bodies, but requiring causation between mental events and physical events in the brain. Husserl, anyway, was not a dualist.

In another direction lies idealism. Many scholars read Husserl's 'transcendental idealism' in tandem with Berkeley and Kant. Indeed, the sections that follow the quotation from *Ideas* I do sound as if Husserl

takes the plunge into antirealism, with the natural world becoming a mere projection of consciousness.<sup>4</sup>

A more subtle approach to the paradox of intentionality lies with monism, and this was Husserl's move, little noticed by his students or by critics long time since.

#### 4. ANOMALOUS MONISM

Husserl's favorite case study (often stressed by Follesdal) is seeing the same object from different sides, revealing different shapes, colors, or other features of the object. You might expect a wider ontology of like form, and you will not be disappointed.

In *Ideas I* (§33), Husserl says the same individual "I" falls under the very different essences called Nature and Consciousness. As a psychophysical human being in nature, I have a body with a variety of physical attributes. As a subject of acts of consciousness, I 'intend' various objects with various properties: I perceive trees, I judge that certain objects are Joshua trees, and so forth. There are not two I's, one physical and one mental. There is only one I, one substrate or substance, with different aspects embracing physical and intentional properties. Husserl's position here is a dual- or plural-aspect ontology, and in that respect a form of monism. In his terms, the mental and the physical aspects are 'moments' of the individual I, i.e., dependent parts of the I, which are concrete instances of the two essences. (Husserl's monism is different from Spinoza's, of course, which assumed only one individual, God.)


Similarly, Husserl says (§33), the same event - of perceiving, judging, or desiring - falls under the different essences of Nature and Consciousness. As a natural phenomenon, it is (in today's terms) an event of neural activity in the brain, causing and caused by other physical events. As an act of consciousness, however, it is an intentional experience representing an object as having such-and-such properties. Where the essence of nature involves causality, the essence of consciousness involves intentionality. And these two essences do not reduce to one another; they are categorically distinct (being different "regions", i.e., different material as opposed to formal categories).

Consider a simple case where I see that tree across the street. What is the ontology of the intentional relation between the visual act and its object? In contemporary terms, we can say the tree *satisfies* the

content of my visual experience. As John Searle puts it, the tree figures in the "conditions of satisfaction" of the intentional content of my visual experience (on the model of Tarski's formulation of truth-conditions for sentences). We can be sure this figure of speech is Husserlian, since, as Hubert Dreyfus reports, Searle channels Husserl.

Now, the intentional relation (or its inverse, satisfaction) is not a causal relation, nor does the property of intentionality reduce in any other way to physical properties. So physical theory, which addresses material composition, causality, etc., does not speak of intentionality. And phenomenology, which addresses intentionality, does not speak of neural processing or physical causation in its account of the intentional relation between act and object of consciousness. Moreover, there are no causal laws that relate the physical and the intentional, i.e., that specify causal relations between events qua physical occurrences and events qua intentional acts of consciousness.<sup>5</sup> For Husserl, the mechanisms of causality and those of intentionality are simply different in essence; the former are physical, the latter are semantic (contentual, satisfactoral).

Husserl's ontology of nature and consciousness - his plural-aspect monism - unfolds in the Second and Third Books of *Ideas*, unpacking the paradox of intentionality observed in the First Book, *Ideas I*.<sup>6</sup> In *Ideas II* (1989) Husserl distinguishes the essences of Nature, Humanity, and Consciousness, dividing Nature into Material and Animal Nature. In a picture:



The essence Nature applies to spatiotemporal entities. The essence Material Nature applies to bodies, with material composition. The essence Animal Nature applies to animals, which have material bodies that are living, 'animated' by 'soul' (*Seele*, drawing on the root meaning). The essence Man or Humanity (*Mensch* or *Menschlichkeit*), also called Spirit (*Geist*), applies to human beings who form a moral community of persons, living in a social world. This region Husserl later called the Lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*). Thus, I have the essence of Animal Nature as well as Material Nature, but also the essence of Man or Humanity, and the essence of Pure Ego or Subject. Natural sciences

study nature, the human sciences study humanity, and "pure" or "transcendental" phenomenology studies consciousness, especially intentionality. Husserl defines psychology as the natural science that studies the soul or the psyche of human beings as natural organisms, as opposed to "persons". *Ideas III* (1980) elaborates on the ontology of the human sciences.

Husserl's ontology entails what Donald Davidson has called *anomalous monism*<sup>7</sup>. For Husserl, physical theory and phenomenological theory form different descriptions that may apply to the same event, describing physical and intentional aspects of the same event - hence monism. However, there are no 'laws of essence' that connect physical and phenomenological descriptions of events, e.g., 'If light of frequency  $f$  strikes the retinas of this body, then I will want to eat strawberries'. Such mixtures of physical and intentional description do not qualify as lawlike statements in a physico-phenomenological theory, so the monism is anomalous.

How is the paradox of intentionality resolved in anomalous monism? In natural psychological theory, we say that we are human beings in nature. In phenomenological theory, however, we say that we are subjects of intentional acts of consciousness. There is no tension between these claims. They simply do not mix in certain kinds of lawlike statements - even though they are about numerically the same entities.

In closer detail, Husserl's story reads in terms of parts and wholes: an individual "I" is a whole that includes as dependent parts, or moments, instances of the essences Nature (Material and Animal), Humanity, and Consciousness. These different aspects or moments are parts of the individual I. They are dependent parts in that they could not exist apart from the whole I. Indeed, a radical holism would say they could not exist apart from each other. In any event, these moments are instances of essences that do not commingle.

##### 5. PURSUIT OF INTENTION

It was Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. In *Word and Object*, Quine wrote:

One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano's, is the second...

Not that I would forswear daily use of intentional idioms, or maintain that they are practically dispensable. But they call, I think, for bifurcation in canonical notation. . . . If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the canonical scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows no quotation but direct quotation and no prepositional attitudes but only the physical constitution and behavior of organisms. (Quine, 1960, §45, "The Double Standard")

Three decades have brought evolution in Quine's attitude toward the intentional (to speak with the everyday scheme). In his masterpiece *Pursuit of Truth*, Quine writes:

Perceptions are neural realities, and so are the individual instances of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. . . . Physicalistic explanation of neural events and states goes blithely forward with no intrusion of mental laws or intensional concepts. What are irreducibly mental are ways of grouping them: grouping a lot of respectably physical perceptions as perceptions that *p*, and grouping a lot of respectably physical belief instances as the belief that *p*. I acquiesce in what Davidson calls anomalous monism, also known as token physicalism: there is no mental substance, but there are irreducibly mental ways of grouping physical states and events. The keynote of the mental is not the mind; it is the content-clause syntax, the idiom 'that *p*'. Brentano was right about the irreducibility of intensional discourse.

But there is no dismissing it. It implements vital communication and harbors indispensable lore about human activity and motivation, past and expected. Its irreducibility is all the more reason for treasuring it: we have no substitute.<sup>8</sup> (Quine, 1990, §29)

This quotation (direct, of course) bespeaks a wider appreciation for the intentional.

What still makes Quine circumspect about the idiom of propositional attitude is its logic. It is the extensional/intensional divide that creates "the linguistic dualism of anomalous monism" (p. 72).<sup>9</sup> Continuing the passage quoted above:

At the same time there is good reason not to try to weave it into our scientific theory of the world to make a more comprehensive system. Without it science can enjoy the crystalline purity of *extensionality*: that is, the substitutivity of identity and more generally the interchangeability of all coextensive terms and clauses, *salva veritate*. The transparency and efficiency of classical predicate logic continue unimpaired. . . .

. . . Formulability within the framework of the predicate calculus is not a sufficient condition of full intelligibility, but to me it is pretty nearly a necessary one. . . .

Note finally that extensionality is no part of my conception of science as such (§8). There is scope for science on the intensional side too, insofar as there are observational checkpoints however tentative. . . . We must be prepared in any event to settle for multiple scientific theories, jointly true.

Thus, the double standard in *Word and Object* - the bifurcation of our canonical idiom into that of science and that of intention - evolves into

anomalous monism in *Pursuit of Truth*. We now have a linguistic dualism with a higher station for the idiom of intention. Indeed, there are resonant uses Quine observes now for the intentional. I want to use a pair of these to show how to Husserl Quine's basic epistemology, the familiar web of human belief.

To Husserl the Quinean web is to specify where intentionality plays its ineliminable role in human knowledge. In *Pursuit of Truth* Quine himself has pressed the intentional into greater service than in his earlier writings, evidently reflecting his dialogue with Follesdal and Davidson (cf. p. 41), for both of whom the intentional is interwoven with meaning and belief.

#### 6. INTENTION OBSERVED

Our system of beliefs form a web. The web is tied to the external world in sensory stimulations.<sup>10</sup> Nearest the perimeter of stimulation lie our observations of the world, e.g., that it is raining. Farthest from the perimeter lie our theoretical beliefs, including scientific hypotheses and, deeper still, our mathematical and logical assumptions. The theoretical serve to systematize, predict, and explain the observational, which in turn give empirical confirmation to the theoretical beliefs. Our beliefs are formulated in language as a web of sentences believed true, sentences to which we would assent in appropriate circumstances. Our assentable sentences range from exterior observation sentences to interior theoretical sentences. Such is the Quinean model of the structure of our knowledge, elegantly expounded by Quine and Ullian in *The Web of Belief* (1978).

Where does intentionality appear in this scheme? In the *Word and Object* perspective, intentionality is eliminated in favor of the sentences we utter in the course of science. In *The Web of Belief* the shift from belief to assentable sentences is a shift of expedience, finessing the ontology of mental states and their contents, propositions. But *Pursuit of Truth* finds pointed use for the intentional, right in the web of belief and assent. Language itself develops in the company of ineliminable mental activities.

Thus Quine writes:

Observation sentences, typically, are reports of events or situations in the external world. Some are mentalistic, however, and they can play an important role. Thus consider, to begin with, the observation sentence 'It's raining'. Tom is learning it from Martha by

ostension. Martha's business is to encourage Tom in uttering the sentence, or in assenting to it, when she sees that he is noticing appropriate phenomena, and to discourage him otherwise. Thus Tom's mastery of the physicalistic sentence 'It's raining' hinges on Martha's mastery, virtual if not literal, of the mentalistic sentence 'Tom perceives that it's raining'.

. . . The handing down of language is thus implemented by a continuing command, tacit at least, of the idiom 'x perceives that p' where 'p' stands for an observation sentence. Command of this mentalistic notion would seem therefore to be about as old as language. It is remarkable that the bifurcation between physicalistic and mentalistic talk is foreshadowed already at the level of observation sentences, as between 'It is raining' and 'Tom perceives that it is raining'. Man is indeed a forked animal. (Quine, 1990, §24)

Not only do our observation sentences 'p' draw in our tacit command of observation-reporting sentences 'x perceives that p'. Our command of observation sentences also rests on a special kind of observation: empathy, which is a richly intentional phenomenon.

Husserl's term for observation was 'intuition' (*Anschauung*), and Husserl counted empathy along with perception as a species of observation. Quine, too. Empathy plays a vital role for Quine in the practice of scientific epistemology, behaviorist sympathies notwithstanding. Indeed, Quine's behaviorism lingers (§14), not with an eliminativist materialism of *Word and Object*, but with an anomalous monism (§29). Where the last quotation leaves off, Quine notes that a perception is a neural event, and different perceptions of its raining will be realized in very different ways as "people's nerve nets differ". Taking the other fork, not the physicalistic but the mentalistic, Quine introduces empathy:

Yet the idiom 'perceives that it's raining' cuts through all that hopeless neurological complexity and encapsulates all perception that it is raining - not just on Tom's part, but on everyone's.

It does so by citing a symptom rather than a neural mechanism. And what a remarkable sort of symptom! We detect it by empathetic observation of the subject's facial expressions and what is happening in front of him, perhaps, and we specify it by a content clause ['that it's raining'] consisting of a vicarious observation sentence.

Martha empathizes Tom's perception that it is raining just as the field linguist empathizes the native's perception that a rabbit has appeared. . . . (Quine, 1990, §24)

Empathy also helps to expand our intentional idiom, in the web of belief and assent, from observation sentences to belief sentences. In Quine's words:

When we ascribe a perception, in the idiom 'x perceives that p', our evidence consists in observing the percipient's orientation and behavior and appreciating that we in his place



would feel prompted to volunteer the content clause ourselves. When we ascribe a belief in the idiom 'x believes that *p*', our evidence is similar but usually more tenuous. We reflect on the believer's behavior, verbal and otherwise, and what we know of his past, and conjecture that we in his place would feel prepared to assent, overtly or covertly, to the content clause. (Ibid., §27)

To "conjecture what we in his place would feel prepared to assent . . . to" is precisely to empathize.<sup>11</sup>

As we maneuver in the web of belief, we find an expanding role of intentionality. Intention goes hand-in-hand with language, theory, and belief. It enters the web with perception, empathy, and introspection or consciousness - three modes of observation.<sup>12</sup> It spreads in relation to action, with emotion, desire, and volition. The intentional side of man, this forked animal, is inescapable.

#### 7. CONSCIOUSNESS REGAINED

With my perception that *p* and my observation sentence '*p*' goes my command of the first-person report 'I perceive that *p*'. It is similar with other intentional attitudes, including my belief expressed by a sentence '*p*' and my ability to declare 'I believe that *p*'. The 'I think' must be able to accompany every proposition '*p*'. Indeed, consciousness itself is very nearly this ability.

When I 'intend' that *p*, when I perceive, judge, desire, or will that *p*, I am often *aware* of my so doing. Consciousness is just that awareness.<sup>13</sup> This omnibus formation - intention and consciousness thereof - is manifest throughout the web of intentional human activities. It is, I suggest, the basis for a disquotational view of truth such as Quine's in *Pursuit of Truth* (1990, §§33ff.) or an "unveiling" view such as Heidegger's in *Being and Time* (1962, §44).

Would Quine reject this notion of consciousness? With anomalous monism, there is no mental substance to fear. Nor should conscious intentional activities conflict with Quine. His lingering behaviorism now amounts to a third-person, externalist perspective on mental events for certain purposes in constructing a certain kind of empirical theory - in one kind of science. Other uses of intention, and one's own awareness thereof in consciousness, are indispensable, and all the more to be treasured, in a first-person, internalist perspective.

Still, not all of our intentional activities are conscious, and there are different grades of awareness of our mental states. We do not live a life

of Cartesian clarity about our inner states, so we learn from Nietzsche to neuroscience.

#### 8. EPISTEMOLOGY INTENTIONALIZED AND PHYSICALIZED

To Husserl Quine's epistemology is thus to begin with anomalous monism and then to write intentional attitudes into the overall account of human knowledge - as Quine himself initiates in *Pursuit of Truth*. This means writing in perception, empathy, and consciousness, along with belief, desire, emotion, and volition: all fundamental modes of human intentional activity.

These same events will be described differently in physical science, speaking of neural activities instead of intentional activities: man being a forked animal.

Epistemology so divides into naturalized, or physicalized, and intentionalized theories of knowledge. The physicalized theories appear in today's cognitive science, especially neuroscience. And the intentionalized theories are today's phenomenology and kindred (if unwitting) philosophies of intentional content.

#### 9. QUINE'S INTENTIONS

To write intentionality into Quine's philosophy is not to introduce a stranger in Quine's midst.

Intention under any other guise is intention, and intention appears regularly in Quine's work: as "positing" entities, in one's theories. The term 'positing' is also Husserl's (*Setzung* is intention; perception and fantasy carry different "positing characters"). For Quine, though, the medium of intention is language rather than mind.

Follesdal has stressed the parallel between linguistic reference and mental intention. For Husserl, reference in language is grounded in mental intention, mediated by sense. For Quine, Fregean or Husserlian sense is suspect (due to indeterminacy of translation). But reference remains (albeit relative to theory and indeterminate). And reference - by names or pronouns - is positing, or intention, in the medium of language.

For Quine, it is quantifiers, or the variables they bind, that do the work of positing entities. "[T]o be is to be the value of a variable. More precisely, what one takes there to be are what one admits as

values of one's bound variables" (Quine, 1990, §10). Names and other terms of reference are regimented in predicates where variables (pronouns writ in first-order logic) do the referential work. Further work is to be done as bodies are 'reified' and 'individuated' in certain forms of sentences (ibid., §§4, 9).

Jaakko Hintikka's conception of quantifiers specifically stresses the individuation of objects their variables range over.<sup>14</sup> This individuation maps well into phenomenology, I have argued on occasion, as the individuation of objects "in consciousness", expressed or reported by quantifying into prepositional attitude contexts.<sup>15</sup> Quantification, individuation, reification, positing - these are the primordial intentional activities, carving out a world of objects as represented in language, or in consciousness, empathy, perception, belief, etc.

If intentionality seems to find resistance in Quine's writings, that is because language forks not only into physicalistic and mentalistic idioms, but also into first- and second-order attitudes: into what we say and what we *say* we say or believe or otherwise 'intend'. Idioms of quantification express intention internal to a language, from a first-person perspective. Idioms of prepositional attitude report intentions, often from an external, third-person point of view. Such reports - especially quantifying into belief contexts and the like - bring a change in logic, from extensional to intensional. And there is the rub to Quine.

Nonetheless, there is room in Quine's *œuvre* for an extensional approximation to prepositional attitude idioms. By treating sentences themselves as the objects of intention, Quine has suggested a way to preserve our language of prepositional attitudes within an extensional first-order logic.<sup>16</sup> And if sentences themselves are alive with intention, the move is not as awkward as it seems at first glance. When we report 'Martha believes that  $p$ ', we attribute to Martha a belief we would express by saying ' $p$ ': that is what we would say if we were in her shoes. So, again, belief attribution rests on empathy.

#### 10. A QUANTUM OBSERVATION

Husserl's paradox of intentionality stems from the needs of a theory of intentionality. Quine's reticence about intentionality stems from the needs of a rigorously scientific physical theory, and the efficiency of an extensional logic. But are there principles in physical theory itself that lead us to think intention is not a part of nature?

In 'Realism with a Human Face' (1990), Hilary Putnam has posed just such a problem. The problem, in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is how to make sense of the "cut" between system and observer in quantum-theoretic measurement. By quantum theory, the observer and the act of observing are in principle outside the system observed (measured with various eigenstates). They can be observed (measured) only in a further observation where they are part of the observed system. Here is a kind of localized vindication of Husserl's technique of bracketing, which separates the intentional object from the intentional act and its subject.

The moral I would draw is: representation (intention) is circumscribed in a particular range of theory. In the quantum scenario, we might say, the system observed is described in physical terms, while the observation itself is described in intentional terms. Intentionality, like the observed eigenstate, knows its place.

Quine (1990, §13) notes that quantum mechanics may require that we to change our logic, perhaps even our concept of existence (with ordinary quantifiers). In the present view, those changes would be confined to a range of physical theory, without necessarily spreading to our everyday theory of the *Lebenswelt*, or indeed to our phenomenology.

## 11. INTENTION IN THE WORLD

By some accounts, Heidegger sought to place intentionality and human knowledge 'in the world', so to eliminate the subject-object relation. That project of mundanizing epistemology must be rethought in light of the reflections above (not least the quantum observation).

When Heidegger develops his phenomenology in *Being and Time* (1962), he averts the traditional 'subject-object' terminology. The 'subject' is transposed as *Dasein*, the intentional 'act' as *Verhalten*, and intentionality as *transcendence*. Thus, *Dasein* relates or comports (*verhaltet*) toward entities (*Seienden*) in the world, and in its comportment it transcends itself and communes with things in the world, notably with tools it is using (as in hammering).

Heidegger holds two principles noteworthy in present company:

- (1) *Dasein* and comportment are, or have being (*Sein*), in the world.

- (2) *Dasein* and comportment are to be interpreted in the same way that phenomenology, as fundamental ontology, studies other entities and ways of being in the world.

Thus did Heidegger 'mundanize' or existentialize phenomenology, as Quine naturalized epistemology with two parallel principles. Where Quine speaks of nature, though, Heidegger speaks of the world. And the world in which we have our being, for Heidegger, is the everyday, social, practical, human world of *Dasein*.

The first principle expresses Heidegger's notion of our "being-in-the-world". We are not cut off from the world we know, as a Cartesian mind is cut off from the external world. The second principle implicates the first in circularity, in the so-called hermeneutic circle. As Heidegger puts it:

Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding [by which entities have meaning], must already have understood that which is to be interpreted [viz., the entities or their being]. (Heidegger, 1962, §32, p. 194)

The 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of *Dasein*. . . . An entity for which, as being-in-the-world, its being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure. (Ibid., p. 195, substituting a small-case 'b' in 'being')

To translate: we are a part of the world, and so is our understanding of entities, their having meaning for us in intentional acts or attitudes. Further, we have a basic level of understanding of the world, on the basis of which we interpret the world in more special ways in the human and natural sciences.

The hermeneutic circle is akin to Husserl's paradox of intentionality as well as the empiricist circle Quine noted (where Carnap and others sought to construct the external world in the same terms as the sense data that gave evidence of it). Behind all three puzzles is the apparent split between subject and object, which is presupposed, it would seem, by the very notion of intentionality.

In *Being-in-the-World* (1991), Hubert Dreyfus divines intentionality as the deep problem that drives Heidegger's philosophy, as well as Husserl's. But Heidegger, Dreyfus explains, seeks to undermine the very distinction between subject and object that defined intentionality for Husserl, a distinction explicit in Descartes and ultimately infecting the whole Western tradition (cf. pp. 50ff.). Like Richard Rorty,

Dreyfus sees Husserl as the culmination of Cartesian dualism. Quoting Heidegger quoting Husserl, Dreyfus writes (p. 74):

Mind and world, Husserl holds, are two totally independent realms of reality. Heidegger focuses on this claim concerning mental content:

This distinction between subject and object pervades all the problems of modern philosophy and even extends into the development of contemporary phenomenology. In his *Ideas*, Husserl says: "The theory of categories must begin absolutely from this most radical of all distinctions of being - being as consciousness [*res cogitans*] and being as being that 'manifests' itself in consciousness, 'transcendent' being [*res extensa*]. Between consciousness [*res cogitans*] and reality [*res extensa*] there yawns a veritable abyss of sense." (*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger, 1982, pp. 124-125], Heidegger's brackets)

Heidegger rejects this traditional interpretation of the mental.

But do Dreyfus and Heidegger have Husserl's ontology of subject and object straight? More important, do the notions of subject and object require a Cartesian ontology?

Husserl, we saw, defined Consciousness and Nature as distinct 'regions of being'. But regions are categories, high-level essences or species, and the same entities - human subjects or their activities - have aspects (moments) that instantiate the two essences Nature and Consciousness. Thus Husserl's monism. Corresponding to the two essences are two realms of sense, two modes of presentation of the same range of entities. The two kinds of essence are ascribed and the two realms of sense expressed in two kinds of language, in phenomenology and natural science. This linguistic/conceptual/aspectual dualism is not Cartesian dualism.

So mind and world are not, for Husserl, as Dreyfus says, "two totally independent realms of reality". First, they are aspects of one realm of entities; second, they are not independent. Husserl took pains to map dependencies between the mental and the physical aspects of a human subject. The Third of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1970a) developed a notion of dependence ( $x$  depends, or is founded, on  $y$  if  $x$  can exist only if  $y$  exists). In the Second Book of *Ideas* (1989), Husserl used that notion in mapping dependence among the physical body, the living body, the animating "soul", and the encultured human "spirit".<sup>17</sup>

Whence: The human subject - also known as you or I or *Dasein* - has its being in the world, as do its compartments, its intentional activities or attitudes. There is only one world, though entities in the world may be viewed and described in different ways and carry different

aspects. The paradox of intentionality and its kin - from the hermeneutic circle to quantum theory's cut between observer and observed - are ways of marking out the boundaries of different ranges of language or theory, including physicalistic and mentalistic. This is the substance of anomalous monism.

To Husserl a Heidegger is thus to assume an ontology of monism, to separate the notion of subject from Cartesian dualism (and prior philosophies), allowing different conceptions of subject, and then to define intention as a relation of subject to object, without presupposing a Cartesian notion of subject.<sup>18</sup> This operation on the "subject" shows the way to more interesting lessons of Heidegger's phenomenology. Instead of a "radical" rejection of the subject-object relation, we find subtle interpretations of our awareness of subject and object, drawn in Heidegger's quasi-poetic language. Subject and object appear in a new (and an old) light, as we come into the clearing in the forest of philosophical theory.

There is no question of the subject not "being-in-the-world". Where else would it be? The question is, rather, which aspect of the subject we are talking about, and in which range of theory or description.

## 12. THE SUBJECT RE-VIEWED

The human subject and its human activities can be viewed in importantly different ways, in disciplines with quite different aims and practices.

The way of natural science seeks lawlike empirical generalizations, predictions, and explanations, e.g., concerning the subject's neural networks.

The way of phenomenology, by contrast, seeks intentionalistic descriptions of human experience and its content, from the subject's own point of view.

The way of psychology may choose between physicalistic and intentionalistic description, with variations in method to match. Davidson's point was that lawlike empirical generalizations cannot mix these two kinds of description. Husserl's claim was that such laws were part of natural science rather than phenomenology *per se*.<sup>19</sup>

Still another way is that of the so-called human sciences. Heidegger's inimitable way chooses interpretive, poetic, sometimes mystical language, characterizing us and our world in ways that circumvent the

more theoretical descriptions, and seeking the indirect understanding we carry in our everyday, prescientific, prephilosophical activities.

To bring together these divergent practices, from neuroscience to phenomenology to poetry, is not to embrace an easy eclecticism. It is, rather, to forge *a pragmatic monism* (albeit anomalous) that recognizes in a disciplined way the multivalence of the human subject.

The *same* subject as it appears in these different disciplines.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The non-Cartesian character of Husserl's epistemology, where even the most intuitively pressing judgments or beliefs are subject to correction or retraction, has been argued persuasively by Dagfinn Føllesdal (1988).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Husserl (1960). Husserl recognizes three kinds of self-evident experience, or intuition: perception, eidetic insight, and phenomenological reflection. Each has its own epistemic character. In other works, he characterizes a secondary kind of intuition, called reproduction, which includes fantasy, recollection and empathy.

<sup>3</sup> In the *Crisis* (1970b), Husserl called a similar puzzle "the paradox of human subjectivity" (§53): How can we human beings constitute the lifeworld around us if we are part of it? The puzzle Husserl resolved by retreating to the "pure" or "transcendental" ego, which constitutes humanity and lifeworld - which in turn constitute the world of physics defined by mathematical formulations. The paradox of intentionality would then be 'the paradox of pure subjectivity': How can the pure I constitute the surrounding world, whether lifeworld or physical world, if the I is part of that world? This is the puzzle Husserl posed in §39 of *Ideas* I. The details of his solution unfold in *Ideas* II, filling in the details of *Ideas* I. See the discussion to follow on anomalous monism.

<sup>4</sup> It was Roman Ingarden's hypothesis that Husserl's (apparent) tendency to idealism was motivated fundamentally by his worry, quoted above, about consciousness relating subject and object in an ontological whole. See Ingarden (1975, pp. 30ff.). Ingarden's insight focuses the problem astutely on the ontology of intentionality. The idealist strand in Husserl has been detailed sharply in Philipse (1994). However, Ingarden and Philipse both miss Husserl's monism, to be discussed below.

<sup>5</sup> Modern cognitive psychology would mix causality and intentionality, while grounding mental representation (intentionality) in neural processing. Husserl mixed the two kinds of properties in what he called phenomenological psychology. The results of "pure" phenomenology, describing intentionality while bracketing the natural world, are paralleled in psychology, a natural science, where mental activities are described as both intentional and natural phenomena. This seems to contradict Husserl's resolution of the paradox of intentionality, noted below.

<sup>6</sup> The details are reconstructed in Smith (1994).

<sup>7</sup> Davidson (1980).

<sup>8</sup> A traditional monist would not privilege the physical over the mental. A substance



that carries both mental and physical aspects is neither mental nor physical substance. But Quine's privilege concerns the use of physical idioms, as noted below.

<sup>9</sup> Hence the substitution of 's' for 't', "intensional idiom" for "intentional idiom". Compare the two quotations, from *Word and Object* and *Pursuit of Truth*.

<sup>10</sup> Stimulations, according to Quine, are not mental events of sensation. They are physical events "at the neural input", e.g., radiant energy affecting the optic nerve at the retina (cf. Quine, 1990, §15).

Anomalous monism brings the two closer together. Stimulations are events describable in physical terms as interaction with nerve endings. The same events might be describable in mentalistic terms as sensations - provided they are registered in one's mental life. Husserl's notion of hyle, or sensory data, are such events. However, Husserl assumes we normally are not aware of pure sensations, but only of already interpreted sensory "appearances" of objects, e.g., perception of color or shape (cf. Husserl, 1969, §§42, 84ff.).

It is interesting that both Husserl and Quine place the sensory origins of human knowledge outside conscious mental activity.

<sup>11</sup> At least as I have reconstructed the notion in Smith (1989, Chap. III).

<sup>12</sup> These three modes of observation acquaint us with physical objects around us, with other persons, and with our own mental states (cf. Smith, 1989, Chaps. I-III).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Smith (1989, Chap. II).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Hintikka (1975).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Smith and McIntyre (1982, Chap. VIII),

<sup>16</sup> The suggestion is developed in Quine (1994). The proposal is in line with Quine's rising estimate of the importance of our language/theory of belief, perception, etc., which facilitates communication.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger had access to these ideas, in *Ideas II*, both when he was assistant to Husserl in Freiburg and later when he wrote *Being in Time* in Marburg. Compare with the translators' introduction to *Ideas II*.

<sup>18</sup> I have defined monism as saying the same entities may have different aspects such as mind and body. A traditional definition says the same *substance* has different aspects, mental and physical. Heidegger would pack a traditional conception of substance into monism, where Descartes's notion of substance (something that can exist independently of all else) is a variation on Aristotle's. I intend a much more neutral notion of entity.

<sup>19</sup> Husserl struggled to distinguish "pure" phenomenology from naturalistic psychology, e.g., in *Ideas III*. He allows phenomenological psychology to describe intentional structure, with the presupposition that intentional activities are part of the natural world. Their relations to brain activity would be a further part of naturalistic psychology. These relations would be constrained by Davidson's anomalous monism.

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